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Abstract 
 
The paper examines specific features of structural change in the UK since 1997, 
contrasting the decline in industrial jobs with the rise in a variety of service jobs. It 
examines the proximate causes of structural change, in particular whether the 
chronically slow growth of manufacturing output in the 1980s has persisted. The 
implications of this structural change are considered, particularly the effects on the 
balance of payments and regional employment patterns. The paper suggests that the 
main impact of government policies on regional employment may have been through 
the direct and multiplier effects of public expenditure.  
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Structural Change under New Labour                                         
 
Ken Coutts, Andrew Glyn and Bob Rowthorn2
 
The main features of structural change in the UK – the decline of industrial jobs with 
a parallel rise in employment across a range of services – have been discussed for 
three decades or more (Singh 1977, Rowthorn and Wells 1987).  This paper examines 
the specific features of structural change over the last nine years since the New 
Labour government under Tony Blair has been in power, drawing on the analysis of 
two earlier papers (Rowthorn (2005), Rowthorn and Coutts (2006)).  The first section 
reviews structural trends and places them briefly in international perspective.  Section 
2 examines the proximate causes of structural change, in particular whether the 
chronically slow growth of manufacturing output, which was such a feature of UK 
performance in the 1980s, has persisted.  Section 3 looks at the implications of this 
structural change, focussing on the effect on the balance of payments and regional 
employment patterns.  Section 4 reviews briefly what government economic 
statements have had to say about these issues and suggests that the real impact of 
government policies on the regions may have been rather different from what was 
expected. 
.  
 
I. Structural Change 1997-2005 
 
Figure 1 presents the trends in the overall employment rate (employment/population 
of working age) and the employment rate in services.  The difference between the two 
represents the proportion of the working age population employed in goods 
production (industry and agriculture).   Since the Labour Party came to power in 1997 
there has been a gentle upward trend in the overall employment rate, though in 2005 
this was still fractionally below the peak rate reached in 1990.  Services have grown 
considerably faster implying that the long-term decline of employment in goods 
production has continued.  In fact it declined at virtually the same rate after 1997 as it 
did over the years of Thatcherite restructuring – 1.8% per year compared to 1.9 % 
over the period 1979-90 – although the fall was somewhat larger during the inter-
regnum period 1990-97 when industrial decline was accelerated by the recession of 
the early 1990s.  Indeed one noteworthy feature of structural change under New 
Labour is that is has occurred without a recession or even a major hiccup in the 
growth pattern. 
 
Figure 2 provides a little more detail by comparing employment in tradeable goods 
with the three biggest service sectors (distribution; public administration, health and 
education3; finance and business services).  The decline in goods employment shows 
up even more starkly in this figure since construction, omitted from tradeable goods, 
                                                 
2 Paper prepared for the Workshop on Evaluating the Economics of New Labour, St Catherine’s 
College, Cambridge, September 12, 2006.  We are very grateful to Graham Gudgin for allowing us to 
use his extensive regional database, to Mary Robertson for analysing the government reports used in 
section 4, to Anne Green and to Jonathan Wadsworth for regional data on employment rates, and to an 
anonymous referee for helpful comments. 
3 This sector is called “public services” in what follows to focus on its dominant characteristic; 
however there is an element of private sector employment included in both health and education and 
there is also an element of public service employment (for example refuse collection) in  “other 
services” which is included below in the category “other private sector”. 
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has experienced rising employment since 1997.  Tradeable goods production now 
accounts for about one eighth of total employment and one tenth of the population of 
working age.  Both the public services sector and distribution exceeded tradeable 
goods in employment terms in 1990.  In 1999, under Gordon Brown’s watch, 
employment in tradeable goods was also overtaken by employment in finance and 
business services.  By 2005 employment in each of these three big service sectors 
exceeded that in tradeable goods production by a sizeable margin. 
 
Distribution employment has stayed pretty flat since 1997, no repeat here of the rise 
in the late 1980s under the Lawson consumer boom.  Finance and business services 
continued to grow strongly, though less rapidly than over the Thatcher period.  After 
1999, however, there was a strong expansion of employment in health and education 
as Gordon Brown’s early squeeze on public spending was relaxed.  This contrasts 
with the stagnation of employment in this sector during the previous decade.  
However this rise had a precedent in a little remarked surge in health and education 
employment under Margaret Thatcher in the second half of the 1980s. 
 
Declining employment in tradeable goods has been the common experience of all 
OECD countries in recent decades.  It is clear from Figure 3, however, that amongst 
the major OECD economies the decline has been sharpest in the UK.  Three decades 
ago the UK stood out with Germany as “workshop economies” with an unusually 
high share of manufacturing employment.  While this share has declined everywhere, 
the UK has now joined the pack with an average share of manufacturing employment 
considerably below Germany’s. 
 
The fact that the three big service sectors in the UK substantially exceed tradeable 
goods in terms of employment was noted above. Table 1 provides some international 
comparisons for employment in these sectors in 2005. In both distribution and banks 
& business services employment in the UK is at the high end of the spectrum, but in 
each case the UK share is exceeded or matched by some other countries – in 
distribution by the USA, France and the Netherlands, in banks & business services by 
France and the Netherlands.  In all countries the share of employment in distribution 
has increased rapidly since 1997. In the case of collective and personal services 
(mainly public services), the UK employment share was at the low end at the start of 
Labour’s period in government, but the gap has subsequently closed as a result of the 
big expansion of health and education jobs in the UK.  Differences between the UK 
and both France and Germany are greater when employment rates rather than shares 
are used – reflecting lower employment overall in the latter two economies. 
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Table 1   Service Sectors – international comparisons 
 
 2005 UK France Germany Neths Sweden USA
% of Total Employment    † †
Distribution  26.6 26.6 23.5 25.7 21.6 27.4
Banks & Business Services 15.7 15.9 13.3 16.1 15.6 12.2
Collective & Personal Services 34.0 31.9 30.8 32.4 38.6 36.3
         
Employment Rates (% of population of working age)     
Distribution  18.8 16.8 15.4 18.6 15.6 18.8
Banks & Business Services 11.1 10.0 8.8 11.7 11.2 8.4
Collective & Personal Services 24.0 20.1 20.2 23.5 27.9 24.9
         
† Note: most recent data is for 2002.      
        
Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics 
 
 
 
2. Causes of Structural Change 
 
Table 2 below compares the UK record under the Tories between 1979 and 1997 with 
performance since the Labour Party came to power in 1997. The main features to note 
are as follows: 
 
(a) Total domestic expenditure and output have both risen much faster under 
Labour than under the Tories.   
(b) Expenditure on manufactured goods has also grown rapidly under Labour. 
Despite this, aggregate manufacturing output has not grown at all, whereas 
in the preceding period it grew at almost 1 % a year.  The combination of 
rising expenditure on manufactures and stagnant domestic production is 
reflected in an accelerating deterioration in the manufacturing trade 
balance (as discussed below). 
(c) As always, manufacturing productivity grew considerably faster than 
productivity in the economy as a whole4.  Since output was stationary, all 
of this productivity growth was translated into manufacturing job 
shedding. 
 
The most striking aspect of structural change under labour has been the continued 
decline of manufacturing against a background of rapid growth in the service sector.   
The shift of jobs from manufacturing to services is a feature of virtually all advanced 
economies and has been underway in this country for approximately four decades. 
However, the pace of change has accelerated under Labour and manufacturing jobs 
have been lost at a faster rate in parts of the country where there was already a surplus 
of labour.  Figure 4 shows that in contrast to the UK, manufacturing output in the 
USA has been quite buoyant and in fact it grew there broadly in line with the output 
of services. 
                                                 
4 Such comparisons are of course dependent on current measures of services output growth.  
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Table 2 
 
Annual percentage change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1979-1997  1997-2005 
Real Domestic expenditure  
Goods & services 2.3 3.4 
Manufactures 1.7 3.4 
  
Domestic production  
Goods & services 2.1 2.7 
Manufactures 0.8 0.0 
  
Employment  
Goods & services 0.3 1.0 
Manufactures -2.5 -3.5 
  
Output per employed person  
Goods & services 1.9 1.7 
Manufactures 3.4 3.7 
  
Note: Domestic expenditure = C+I+G , domestic production = GDP 
Source: ONS and authors’ calculations  
  
The role of trade with low wage exporters in eliminating manufacturing jobs in the 
industrialised countries is a contentious issue.  Rowthorn and Coutts (2004, updating 
Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 1999) undertook an econometric analysis of 
manufacturing employment across OECD countries.  Their detailed results suggested 
trade with these countries reduced the UK manufacturing employment share by 1.3 
percentage points between 1992 and 2002, about one quarter of the total decline.  
Assuming this effect has continued at a similar rate after 2002, it would follow that 
imports from low wage countries have eliminated around 300,000 manufacturing jobs 
under Labour.  This is a net figure which takes into account the fact that some new 
jobs have also been created in the manufacturing sector through the export of high-
tech products to the low wage economies.  
 
 
3. Implications of Structural Change 
 
This section considers whether recent structural change has been benign in the UK – 
simply reflecting differential sectoral growth rates of demand, productivity and 
international specialisation – or whether it is giving rise to significant structural 
“problems”.   Discussion on this issue has tended to focus on two issues – the current 
account of the balance of payments (the ability of the UK to continue “paying its 
way”) and problems of labour market adjustment particularly within the old industrial 
regions most affected. 
 
 
 
 5
(i) Manufacturing and the balance of payments 
 
The seminal paper on UK deindustrialisation by Ajit Singh (1977) concentrated on 
implications for the balance of payments.  As Rowthorn and Wells (1987) 
emphasised, the UK had been unusually dependent historically on manufacturing, and 
the capacity of manufacturing industry to generate sufficient exports was a major 
preoccupation in the immediate post war decades.  We noted in section 1 that there 
has been a very rapid growth of net imports of manufactures into the UK.  How has 
the current account of the balance of payments overall fared? 
 
Figure 5 shows that the current account has deteriorated after 1997 and for several 
years there has been a deficit fluctuating around 2% of GDP.    As well as the 
conventional current price measure of the current account (continuous black line), the 
diagram also shows a constant price measure5.  The difference between the two series 
shows the impact of terms of trade changes.  Without an improvement in the terms of 
trade – fall in import prices relative to export prices - the deficit would have increased 
by an additional 1% of GDP6. 
 
During the period in question, the trade deficit in manufactures got much larger and 
there was also some deterioration in the balance on “other visibles” ( Figure 6).  
However, these losses were mostly offset by a substantial improvement in the 
invisibles balance.   Which invisibles have come to the rescue?  Figure 7 shows that 
much of the improvement in invisibles has been concentrated in the so-called 
“knowledge-based services” – finance and business services such as consulting, 
engineering, computer & information services, R&D etc. “Traditional” services, 
above all tourism, have yielded a growing deficit7.  But just as important as success in 
knowledge-based services has been a rise in net investment income from rough 
balance in the early 1990s to a surplus of 2% of GDP now – an impressive result and 
quite a puzzling one since the current account has been in persistent deficit for over 
two decades (which in itself must increase net overseas debt, the UK having beome a 
debtor country in the past decade), and the pound has been very strong (which should 
hit sterling earnings from overseas assets).  Nevertheless there was a surge in UK 
returns on direct investment abroad, which brought net earnings on this type of 
                                                 
5  This is a calculated as the current account surplus plus the difference between exports and imports of 
goods and services at current as compared to constant (2003) prices.  Implicitly therefore no adjustment 
is made for a “terms of trade” for transfers. It is striking that the terms of trade for UK imports and 
exports of manufactures have hardly changed since 1997 – prices of both having fallen by about one 
sixth. 
6 This calculation ignores the fact that there would have been some offsetting volume effects (slower 
real growth of net imports) but these would have been small. 
7 We have adopted a broad definition of knowledge-based services as all services other than the 
traditional services – the latter being transportation, travel and government services. Education-related 
services should also be included in the knowledge-based group, but they do not easily fit this 
classification. These activities include tuition fees and purchases of goods and services of foreign 
students taking courses in the UK, fees and education products for students taking courses in their own 
countries, examination board earnings and publication of education materials including broadcast 
programmes. An estimate of the services earnings from education for 2001-02 based on Johnes (2004) 
is £8.2 billion.  In the balance of payments accounts these earnings are scattered throughout various 
parts of visible and invisible trade, but some of it is attributed to travel services. In our classification 
the surplus on education-related services helps to offset the large deficit on tourism, which for 2001-02 
was about £15.8 billion. 
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investment up from near balance in the late 1990s to a surplus of almost £45 billion in 
20058. 
  
A final point on the balance of payments concerns the “other visibles” portion (Figure 
6), which has wobbled along in modest deficit for about two decades.  This part of the 
account is quite vulnerable to two influences.  First, rising commodity prices tend to 
bring deterioration as is evident already in the data for the last couple of years.  
Secondly this account had previously received a massive boost when North Sea Oil 
came on-stream (it was in deficit to the tune of 6-10% of GDP in the first half of the 
1970s).  This masked the decline of the coal industry - a spectacular example of 
structural change in itself but one that had mainly run its course by the time New 
Labour came to power.  However it is now North Sea Oil which is running down and 
by 2025 the UK will only be 25% self-sufficient in energy according to official 
projections.  So the prospect is for a worsening energy deficit, compounding any 
continuing weakness of manufacturing exports. 
 
To summarise the above discussion, a substantial deterioration in the manufacturing 
trade balance has had a rather muted effect on the current account for three reasons.  
Firstly, the overall terms of trade have moved in favour of the UK, benefiting the 
current account to the tune of 1% or more of GDP since 1997.  Secondly, there has 
been a fortuitous rise in net investment income from abroad.  Thirdly, the knowledge- 
based services have done very well, despite the overvalued exchange rate which piled 
such pressure on UK manufacturing exporters.  However the UK does seem 
vulnerable to a downward fluctuation in net investment income, to deterioration in the 
terms of trade and to a worsening of the deficit on the energy account.  It is unlikely 
that growing exports of knowledge-based services could be relied on to offset such 
developments. 
 
(ii) Structural change and regional patterns 
 
The decline in tradeable goods production has affected the old industrial “North” of 
Britain more than the more service based “South”, whilst the latter has gained more 
from the expansion of finance and business services.  This has exacerbated a long-run 
shortfall of jobs in the North and contributed to a gradual shift in the balance of 
population as inter-regional and international migration responds to differential 
employment opportunities.  This section reviews in more detail how the employment 
structure in the North and South has evolved over recent decades and whether there is 
evidence of a change in trend in the most recent experience. 
 
When considering  a regional economy, it is important to distinguish between goods 
and services that can be traded across the regional boundary and those which  must be 
supplied locally. The terms "tradeable" and "non-tradeable" are used to denote the two 
                                                 
8  Balance of payments measurement conventions record retained earnings from foreign direct 
investment abroad (FDI) as an income credit, while at the same time treating the retained earnings as 
additional direct investment and therefore as a debit on the financial account (IMF, 1993). This 
procedure can raise problems of interpreting the underlying rates of return on FDI, particularly where 
the investments are mainly financial transactions in equity. Godley (2003) has pointed out some of the 
oddities of the measurement conventions. While we are not aware of evidence that the conventions 
result in systematic bias in the estimates of the UK net income from FDI, this is an area that requires 
further research, since the sustainability of the UK current account depends crucially on the strong 
performance of net income from investment and tradeable services. 
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categories. The tradeable category includes most agricultural products, fuels, minerals 
and manufactures, a large part of financial and business services, together with 
smaller parts of other sectors.  Some public services, such as national administrative 
offices, also belong under this category, since they provide a service to the areas of 
the country outside of the region in question.  In practice, the dividing line between 
the two categories is by no means clear, and the difference between tradeables and 
non-tradeables is a matter of degree.  In this paper, we classify all agricultural 
products, fuels, minerals and manufactures as tradeable goods.  We also use finance & 
business services as a proxy for tradeable services.  This is not an ideal approach since 
this sector includes many local activities that require geographical proximity for their 
delivery. Conversely, there are other sectors that contain tradeable components, such 
as hotels and restaurants serving visitors to the region (or locals who would otherwise 
travel outside of the region to obtain these services). Some public services are also 
tradeable, such as higher education institutions which attract students (and their fees).    
By using finance & business services as a proxy for tradeable services, we assume 
that wrongly included and wrongly excluded items cancel out.  
 
The distinction between tradeables and non-tradeables is important because it gives us 
some idea of the underlying economic strength of a region and its ability to 
autonomously generate incomes and employment of all kinds. If a region produces a 
very small amount of tradeable goods and services, it will be much poorer than the 
rest of the country and will normally be supported by large fiscal transfers from the 
central government.. Such transfers will reduce the gap between the region in question  
and the rest of the country, but they will not eliminate this gap entirely.  Unless the 
region can generate more tradeable activities, it will remain comparatively poor, with 
lower than average incomes and a lower than average employment rate.  In analysing 
the evolution of inter-regional differences, it is therefore important to identify the 
independent generators of wealth.  It is for this purpose that we identify employment 
in tradeable activities as a separate category. Such employment provides a useful, 
albeit crude, indication of a region's underlying economic strength9. 
 
The reference point in Figure 8 is the continuous thick line showing the ratio of the 
population of working age (shortened to population below) in the North to the 
population in for the South.10  The downward slope indicates a prolonged decline in 
the North’s share of population although there are now signs that this may be coming 
to an end. In absolute numbers, population in the North stagnated until around the 
year 2000, but since then it has been rising quite strongly.  However, population in the 
South has risen even faster, so in relative terms the Northern share has continued to 
fall, albeit at a much slower pace. An important element in this story is the role of 
migration.  At one time, there was a net outward flow of people from the North and a 
net inflow into the South (Figure 9).  This was a major factor behind the stagnation of 
population in the North and the growth of population in the South.  Since 2000, 
however, the net outflow of population from the North has been reversed and like the 
South it is experiencing net inward migration. This is arithmetically possible because 
Great Britain as a whole is gaining population through immigration from abroad.    
                                                 
9 The regional role of tradeables is discussed more fully in Rowthorn  (2000). 
10  Here the South comprises Greater London, the South East, the South West, the East Midlands and 
the East, whilst the North represents the rest of England plus Wales and Scotland. Fortuitously dividing 
the country up in this way leaves the North and South with populations of very similar size. 
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The dashed line for comparative total employment in Figure 8 lies systematically 
below the population line, showing the persistently lower employment rate in the 
North.  In the 1980s, employment fell faster in the North than the South, and the 
widening gap with the population line shows that the fall in the employment rate was 
larger too.  The North-South divide was reasserting itself with a vengeance. 
 
The series for tradeable goods, lying well above the population line, shows how 
dependent the more industrialized North had been on this sector.  Such dependence 
made it especially vulnerable to the industrial crisis of the early 1980s; moreover, the 
crisis was especially severe in the North so that the proportionate fall in tradeable 
goods employment was much greater than in the South.  Conversely, financial and 
business services employed far fewer people in the North, with the line representing 
the employment ratio between North and South far below the line for population.  
Thus the North gained much less from the expansion of finance and business services 
(which includes a sizeable tradeable element - finance, law and consulting firms 
mostly concentrated in London).  The downward slope in the finance line throughout 
most of the period shows that the proportionate rate of growth of jobs in this sector 
was slower in the North, as well as starting from a lower base.   
 
As noted earlier, our category “public services” consists of mainly public sector 
employees but it includes an increasing number of private sector providers of health 
and education services.  Employment in public services in the North was less than the 
population share in the 1980s,  but subsequently has grown faster there so that it had 
become a more important provider of jobs in the North than in the South by the mid-
1990s (when the public services line crosses the population line).  “Other private 
sector” (mainly non-tradeables like distribution and construction) has consistently 
employed fewer people in the North, no doubt reflecting lower incomes per head.   
 
The North suffered less across the board in the recession of the early 1990s, and this 
pulled up the “other private sector” line along with the other sectors.   This narrowing 
of the gap between North and South looked to have been a temporary hiccup as the 
subsequent recovery brought faster employment growth in the South, except for 
public services.  However, from around 2000 a change in trend emerged.  
Employment has been growing proportionately faster in the North, and with 
population still growing somewhat faster in the South, the gap in employment rates 
has definitely narrowed.  Initially the improvement was mainly in public services, but 
latterly these have been growing at similar rates in the two parts of the country.  More 
recently other private sector jobs and perhaps most interestingly finance & business 
services have been growing proportionately faster in the North (though from a much 
lower base).  This is really quite a striking turnaround. 
 
A more precise appreciation of trends under Labour can be gained from Table 3 
below which compares 1997-2005 with the preceding 8 year period.  The employment 
to population ratio fell a little in both North and South between 1989 and 1997, but 
after 1997 the position in both regions, especially the North, improved quite 
markedly.  During the latter period, the North lost jobs in the tradeable goods sector 
even faster than in the earlier period, but this was more than offset by rapid growth in 
other sectors, above all finance & business services and public services. As a result, 
total employment in the North grew by 0.7% a year faster than population of working 
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age, whereas in the South the two grew almost the same rate.  As a result the 
employment gap between North and South has closed by some 3%.  As compared to 
the previous period,  the main differences were that the South was no longer drawing 
further ahead in terms of jobs in finance and the North was catching up in terms of  
other private sector where there was slightly faster growth in the North across the 
board - construction, distribution, transport and other services.  The benefit to the 
North from faster growth of public services since 1997 was a continuation of the 
earlier trend, but none the less important for that11.  Taking the whole period since 
1989, without the direct effect of public sector jobs the number of people in 
employment in the North would have grown no faster than the South.  We shall return 
to this point in the final section. 
 
                                                 
11  The importance of the expansion of public sector jobs for employment in the North, and the 
weakness of private sector job creation, was emphasised in an article by Chris Giles entitled “Forgotten 
Britain: how Labour has presided over a deepening divide” (Financial Times March 20, 2006).  
However the impression from this article was that the divide has increased under  Labour, which is not 
true in terms of  the overall employment rate as was shown above. 
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Table 3.  North and South Employment and Population Trends 1989-2005 
 
Average annual percentage change 
 
 South North 
1989-
1997 
South 
1997-
2005 
North 
1989-
1997 
1997-
2005 
Employment     
Tradeable Goods -2.3 -2.0 -3.3 -3.6 
Finance and Business Services 2.5 1.4 2.2 3.2 
     
Other Private Sector 0.3 -0.3 1.2 1.5 
0.1 0.9 1.9 2.6 Public Services 
     
0.2 -0.2 1.0 1.1 Total Employment 
     
0.4 -0.1 0.8 0.4 Population of Working Age 
 
Source: Calculations from Regional Forecasting’s database, by kind permission of 
Graham Gudgin. 
 
 
The improvement in the relative position of the North over the past five years is 
encouraging.  But the gap in employment rates is still some 5 % points – about one 
half of the maximum differential in the second half of the 1980s.  Even quite modest 
differences in employment rates for the two halves of the country may translate into 
much bigger differences for disadvantaged groups and in smaller, but still substantial, 
areas.  Regional differences in employment rates are very small for the highly 
qualified and even for those with middling qualifications.  But for the least qualified, 
differences in the chance of being in work are still huge (Figure 10).  Even prime age 
men were some 20% less likely to be in work in the North East than the South East in 
2001; within some metropolitan areas like Merseyside the shortfall in jobs as 
compared to the South East was larger still (see Erdem and Glyn 2001).  Hopefully, 
the recent improvement in employment in the North has been filtering through to 
these workers as well but there was a very large shortfall to make up12. 
                                                 
12 Calculations from the Labour Force Survey by Jonathan Wadsworth suggest that the gap between the 
employment rates of the least educated in the North and South has declined somewhat since around 
2000 (personal communication). 
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4.  Government Policies 
 
Whilst the issues discussed above have implications for a wide range of government 
policies, we only have space to touch briefly on the implications of structural change 
discussed earlier in this paper.  Accordingly this section reviews the government’s 
relatively relaxed attitude about structural change, covering first the balance of 
payments and then regional employment implications.  We note in the latter context a 
sharp contrast between the Government’s supply-side rhetoric, and the very important 
demand-side effects of public spending in helping to reduce regional employment 
differences in the past few years 
 
 A typical, optimistic, Treasury statement about structural change is the following: 
  
 “changes in the structure of employment and production are a necessary part of 
economic development and flow not just from openness to trade but also from 
technological developments and changes in consumer preferences. The benefits of 
structural change are apparent in hindsight but often resisted as they occur…..The 
process of redeployment inevitably brings transitional costs, which may fall 
particularly heavily on those least well-equipped to cope with change – for example 
those with non-transferable skills.  But the outcome for the economy as a whole is 
positive and there is a great deal governments can do to minimise transitional 
disruption to individuals.” (Treasury 2004 paras 2.15, 2.16) 
 
To ease such adjustment costs, an adequate system of benefits and in particular 
improvements in skill provision and acquisition are emphasised. 
 
The implications of long-term decline in the net exports of manufacturing receive no 
attention in the Treasury’s annual budget statements; indeed the current account of the 
balance of payments, which used to be such a policy preoccupation a generation ago, 
barely rates a mention, let alone a longer term analysis. There are hints in the 
comments on the beneficial role of the City in contributing to net exports that there 
could be a gap to fill (Treasury 2005 para 1.4), but no analysis of how it has emerged 
or might develop. 
 
The DTI, with specific industrial responsibility, published a Manufacturing Strategy 
(DTI 2002) which said that manufacturing was “crucial to our country’s prosperity, 
now and in the future”.  It noted that manufacturing employed 4 million people, 
accounted for 60% of exports, but that its productivity level lagged behind European 
rivals.  Such perennial problems as investment and workforce skills were discussed 
but one of the “pillars” of the strategy was macroeconomic stability, a matter on 
which the government, and of course the Chancellor in particular, takes such pride.   
 
The remarkable stability of economic growth over the past decade has diverted 
attention away from one obvious problem – the extremely high value of sterling.  The 
series for relative unit labour costs in manufacturing – the best measure of the real 
exchange rate - appreciated by one half between 1993 and 2000.  It reached a higher 
level than the peak after the monetary squeeze in the early 1980s and the present high 
level has been maintained for the last six years (OECD Economic Outlook June 2006 
table 43).  The DTI voiced a hint of reservation about this: “experience shows that 
changes in exchange rates by themselves don’t explain the medium- to long-term 
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success or failure of national manufacturing sectors.  Nevertheless the weakness of 
the euro [not the strength of sterling – authors] has been a real source of problems for 
many manufacturers.” (DTI 2002 p 19)   
 
The Treasury itself discussed the strength of sterling in its 2003 document on “The 
Exchange Rate and Macroeconomic Adjustment” issued as part of the review of  
possible UK  adoption of the Euro:   
 
“Empirical analysis suggests that exchange rate movements have not been a 
significant source of shocks to the UK economy as a whole.  Instead exchange rate 
changes appear to have absorbed shocks that might otherwise have had a greater 
impact on UK output and prices.  A striking example of this is sterling’s strong 
appreciation after 1996, which did not result in higher unemployment or a collapse in 
inflation, but nonetheless restrained the net export contribution to demand and thus 
probably alleviated some of the inflationary pressure that might otherwise have 
occurred.” (para 7.4)   
 
The Treasury did admit to “large exchange rate changes posing particular difficulties” 
for importers and exporters but there was no discussion of potential long-run damage 
to the traded goods sector.  The respite given to the traded goods sector by the 
depreciation at the end of 1992 is obvious in Figure 6 above, together with the 
resumption of rapid decline of traded goods jobs as sterling appreciated under the 
Blair government.  As noted earlier, the balance of payments has performed better 
than might have been expected given the high real exchange rate in recent years, but 
this has owed a good deal to fortuitous improvements in the terms of trade and 
overseas investment income and in the future the balance on energy trade is certain to 
decline as well.  The Treasury’s implicit position that persistent current account 
deficits do not matter may yet turn out to have serious longer-term consequences for 
the UK economy. 
 
The Treasury has also taken an optimistic view of the impact of structural change on 
regions.  In its 2001 paper Productivity in the UK: 3 – The Regional Dimension it 
conceded that “a region’s industry mix plays some role in explaining individual 
regions and localities’ economic problems”, but then argued that “on the whole it does 
not critically constrain a region’s growth potential” (box 2.1).  By 2004 the claim was 
bolder:  “The impact on the economy of these structural shifts, due to both trade and 
technological change, has been strongly positive.  Wages in both manufacturing and 
services have risen, reflecting productivity gains.  Employment as a whole has risen.  
Those regions which depended heavily on manufacturing have maintained their share 
in total employment, reflecting the creation of new jobs in non-traditional sectors” 
(Trade and the Global Economy 2004 para 2.27).   As a statement of fact this last 
statement is simply wrong, as the discussion in the previous section showed. 
 
The Treasury’s approach to the regions has been to play down the systematic 
concentration of joblessness in some large areas of the country arguing that it is sub-
regional disparities which are the problem. “Despite the strong labour market 
performance of recent years, within every region there remain localised pockets of 
high worklessness and deprivation (our emphasis)….Local authority districts that 
suffer from low employment rates do not simply lack jobs.  Many are found alongside 
other districts with large numbers of vacancies or jobs….The Government’s goal of 
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full employment in every region therefore requires policies to address the barriers 
which prevent local people from taking local jobs”  (Treasury 2002 Economic 
Statement para 4.38). 
 
The policy conclusion has been to focus on supply side improvements, characterising 
post-war  regional policy as “ambulance work getting help to high unemployment 
areas” and the incentives to investment in the regions in the 1960s and 1970s  as  
inflexible, top-down and ineffective (Balls 2002 p 12). 
 
As we saw earlier in the paper, there has been a distinct improvement in the 
employment situation in the North in the past five years or so.  Three possible 
explanations suggest themselves: 
 
(i) Supply side improvements under the aegis of the Regional Development 
Agencies have slowly worked to increase the attractiveness of the North 
for investment; 
(ii) Prolonged economic expansion has radiated out from the South as 
bottlenecks and constraints were felt there; 
(iii) The government’s expansion of the public services, plus infrastructural 
investment, has provided a large injection of aggregate demand into the 
regions. 
 
These three factors are not mutually exclusive and may all have played a role.  The 
point to be stressed here is that an old fashioned injection of aggregate demand (factor 
iii) has most probably been a very important influence despite the Treasury’s disdain 
for such an approach. The most visible measure of public spending on jobs is 
provided by our series for public service employment, which has expanded especially 
fast in the North over the last decade and very rapidly everywhere including the North 
over the past five years.  However, less than half of the money spent on public 
consumption goes on public sector wage bills, and the majority is devoted to goods 
and services that are bought in or contracted out to external suppliers. Public 
investment in the regions also creates demand for construction13.  Thus, public 
consumption and investment have a much larger impact on regional employment than 
is reflected merely in the series for public service employment.  Referring back to 
Table 3 above, a substantial part of the expansion of private sector employment in the 
North, including finance and business services, must be a spin-off from rising public 
expenditure. As noted in the previous section, public service employment alone 
accounts for virtually all of the increase in employment in the North since 1989, and 
for much of the growth since 1997.  The point to be emphasised here is that the total 
amount of employment created by public spending is much greater than this direct 
effect, once government purchases from the private sector are included as well. If we 
take into account these further direct and multiplier effects, it seems plausible that the 
entire growth of employment in the North since 1997 is the result of public 
expenditure. 
 
An analysis for the UK as a whole (Edmonds and Glyn 2005) found that all the net 
job creation since 2000 could be statistically attributed to the expansion of public 
                                                 
13  Note that the public services employment category includes some private sector workers provided 
they are employed in the first instance by the private sector (agency nurses working in the NHS). 
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spending.  As the authors point out, such a finding should be interpreted with care, 
since it is always possible that some of the employment created by public spending is 
at the expense of other types of employment.  Indeed, this is true as a matter of 
arithmetic in an area where there is already full employment and there is no migration 
across its boundaries. There is no area of the UK where these conditions hold 
completely. However there are parts, especially in the South, where they held 
sufficiently, at least until the recent rise in inward migration from the EU accession 
countries, to imply that jobs created by public spending have been mostly at the 
expense of other jobs.  Conversely, there are also many areas in the country, 
especially in the North, but also in parts of the South such as inner London, where 
there is a large surplus of certain kinds of labour.  To the extent that public spending 
creates a demand for such labour, many of the jobs created by it are likely to be 
additional to existing employment.  This is most likely to be the case if expenditure is 
financed by levies on people outside of the area concerned.  For example, suppose 
that taxes are levied disproportionately on employed people in the South and are spent 
disproportionately in depressed areas of the North which have a large surplus of 
labour.  This will not only create jobs in these areas, but it will also increase the share 
of the North as a whole in national employment.  Even a uniform increase in public 
spending will alter the national distribution of employment, since its employment 
creating effects are more likely to be offset by crowding out in the South than in the 
labour-surplus North. 
 
The above argument is based on standard multiplier theory and does not take into 
account the incentive effects of public spending.  These are slow to operate and may 
be positive or negative.  On the positive side, public spending may finance urban 
renewal and make some of the old industrial areas more pleasant to live in.  It may 
also add to the human and physical capital of the area through education and 
infrastructural investment.  All of these are factors that may induce firms to do 
business there and build up the local economic base. On the negative side, the 
prospect of a secure public sector job paid at national rates may prop up local wages 
and make the area less competitive in national and international markets. Moreover, 
the prospect of such a job may deter talented individuals from committing themselves 
to the riskier private sector.    
 
The incentive effects outlined above are potentially important, but we are not able to 
quantify them, although it is our view that on balance the positive effects greatly 
outweigh the negative ones.   Others may disagree. What does seem fairly clear, 
however, is that the direct and multiplier effects of public spending have had a 
powerful and immediate impact on employment in the North and on the share of this 
region in the national total.  It is striking that the government is so reluctant to 
acknowledge this effect, which has contributed in a very important way to the 
improvement in employment in the least prosperous regions of the country. 
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Figure 1  UK Total Employment and Services 1979-2005:
as % of Population of working age 
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Figure 2:  UK employment patterns: 1979-2005
as % of Population of working age
0
5
10
15
20
25
1979 1985 1991 1997 2003
Tradeable Goods (Ag,Mining,Man) Distribution
Finance and Business Services Pub Admin, Health, Education
 
 
 
Source: calculated from series on ONS website 
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F ig u r e  3 :  S h a r e  o f  M a n u fa c tu r in g  E m p lo y m e n t  in  E u r o p e  a n d  
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Figure 4: Manufacturing Output and Employment
logarithmic indices
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Figure 5   UK Current Account  % GDP, 1979-2005
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Source: UK Pink Book, database on ONS website 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Components of the UK Balance of Payments 
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Figure 7: Invisibles component of the UK Balance of Payments
1987 - 2005
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Figure 8  North/South Employment and Population 1979-2005
ratio of employment in North to employment in South
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Source: elaboration of data in Regional Forecasting’s database. 
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Figure 9:    Net Migration (Working Age): 1971 - 2004
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Figure 10: Employment Rates for Age 25-49 by Qualification, 2001 
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Source: Anne Green, University of Warwick 
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